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OVER-THE-COUNTER MARKET QUOTATIONSt 
Philip A. Loomis, Jr.* and Eugene H. Rot berg** 
C HAFTER VII of the Report of Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange Commission1 focused 
attention upon the little understood and often perplexing prob-
lems presented by the quotations for over-the-counter stocks which 
appear regularly in the newspapers-the so-called retail quotations 
system. The Report was quite critical of the existing retail quota-
tions system, concluding that it was inconsistent with the general 
philosophy of full disclosure elsewhere applied in the administra-
tion of the federal securities laws and, in fact, operated "to conceal 
what elsewhere in the securities business is considered essential to 
be disclosed."2 While there does not appear to be unanimity in 
the securities industry with respect to the efficacy of the sytem, it 
is vigorously defended by its supporters as important, if not essen-
tial, to the business survival of smaller over-the-counter dealers 
and to the liquidity of the markets in many securities. It seems 
clear, therefore, that the problem warrants the attention which it 
will undoubtedly receive, both from the National Association of 
Securities Dealers (NASD) and from the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. 
The retail quotations system reflects to some degree the under-
lying mechanics of the over-the-counter market, which are in many 
respects quite different from those of an exchange market; conse-
quently, some general background concerning such mechanics 
appears appropriate. 
INTER-DEALER MARKETS 
In the over-the-counter market there is no central location 
where all public or professional buyers and sellers communicate 
their interest in the purchase or sale of securities. Markets are 
t This article carries a date of authorship of November 4, 1963. The Securities and 
Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any private 
publication by any of its members or employees. Therefore, the views expressed here 
are the authors' own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or its 
staff. 
• General Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission; Member of the California 
Bar and the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States.-Ed. 
• • Chief Counsel, Office of Program Planning, Securities and Exchange Commission; 
Member of the District of Columbia Bar and the Pennsylvania Bar.-Ed. 
1 H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) (hereinafter cited as Special Study]. 
2 Special Study pt. 2, at 674. 
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made by and between broker-dealers who communicate quotations 
representing the prices at which they wish to deal for their own 
account in particular securities. These broker-dealers, commonly 
referred to as market makers, quote "bid" and "asked" prices and 
hope to profit from the difference between the "bid," the price 
at which they are willing to purchase a security, and the "asked," 
the price at which they are willing to sell the security. The mar-
ket maker essentially performs a passive role in trading for his 
own account in response to incoming inquiries of buyers and sellers. 
To the extent that he purchases or sells on balance in transactions 
with other broker-dealers (who may be acting for themselves or for 
public customers), he adds depth to the market and performs a 
function somewhat similar to that of a specialist on a national se-
curities exchange. Each market maker quoting prices in a par-
ticular security also, in a sense, functions as a minature exchange 
providing a situs for the collection of buy and sell orders. The 
analogy, however, cannot be drawn too far, for on an exchange the 
orders of buyers and sellers can be, and often are, executed on the 
floor of the exchange without professional intervention. By con-
trast, in the over-the-counter market, although the market maker 
provides a situs for collection of orders and their execution, the 
orders funnelled to him do not cross. Instead, the market maker 
is compensated by trading for his own account and profiting by the 
difference between the price paid by buyers and that received by sell-
ers-the spread or so-called jobbers turn.8 There are sometimes as 
many as thirty market makers, or as few as one, simultaneously 
quoting a market to those who are interested in a particular secu-
rity. The number of competing market makers usually depends 
on the volume of transactions and the related possibility of profit 
from a high turnover of purchases and sales. Each of the compet-
itors, through variations in his quotations, attempts to attract 
buying and/ or selling interest. 
Competing market makers do not transmit their quotations 
or the prices of execution of particular transactions into a central 
location. Instead, they advertise their markets through a facile 
and inexpensive voice and printed telegraph wire network which 
links them to other broker-dealers and perhaps to institutional 
clients throughout the country. Open-end telephones and private 
s It should be recognized, o[ course, that the maintenance of a spread does not assure 
profit since the depreciation in market value of an accumulated inventory may and often 
does seriously impair the financial benefits derived from the spread. Also a dealer may 
not be able to buy at his bid and sell at his asked. 
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teletype wires, which permit almost instant communication, feed 
out from the offices of major market makers in financial centers 
to blanket the country and advise the financial community of the 
quotations in securities traded over-the-counter. The greater the 
number of communication links controlled or used by a particular 
market maker, the greater the chance that he will be a dominant 
factor in the market in terms of the volume of business done, com-
pared to competitors quoting the same security. 
The information transmitted on the communication network 
is not public. The system is bilateral and basically inter-dealer; 
i.e., communication is generally private between the parties, both 
of whom usually are professionals, one a market maker-the other 
a broker-dealer acting for a member of the public or on his own 
behalf;' Because the system is bilateral and private rather than 
public and open, a broker-dealer wishing to execute a public 
customer's order with a market maker must check a number of 
lines of communication with competing market makers in order 
to obtain the best market. In an exchange market such checking is 
unnecessary, since the market on the floor of the exchange is, by 
definition, the best market made both on the bid and offer side by 
the various professional and public participants. Their bids and 
offers, in effect, are aggregated and the best of these hold the floor 
of the exchange as "the market." 
In addition to teletype and voice communication, broker-
dealers in the over-the-counter market submit their quotations at 
a particular point in the day to the National Quotation Bureau, 
a private organization which disseminates the quotations on the 
following morning for the use of the financial community. The 
National Quotation Bureau "sheets" generally are not publicly 
available. They identify the security, the name of each market 
maker inserting a quotation, his telephone number and his bid 
and asked quotation. This information is available for approx-
imately 8,000 securities on a daily basis. The quotations are sup-
posed to represent the precise quotation at which an inserting 
dealer was willing and able to execute transactions at the time of 
the submission of its quotation. Although these quotations are 
"stale" when disseminated, they provide a rough guide to the ap-
proximate market price of the security on the preceding day.IS 
4 Large institutional or sophisticated customers may have access to the market place 
and trade directly with the market maker at his quoted prices rather than executing 
the order with or through other broker-dealers. 
IS For a detailed discussion of the mechanics involved in the receipt and dissemination 
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It should be emphasized that the quotations of market makers 
are disseminated upon inquiry from others. They are not con-
tinuously reported, even privately, but rather are continuously 
available to the broker-dealer community if requested. In active 
stocks, because of the steady flow of requests for markets, quota-
tions may emanate from the market makers on a more or less 
continual basis to all inquirers; any specific inquirer for a quota-
tion, however, must recheck the market if it does not execute im-
mediately, because industry custom and practice considers a quota-
tion good only during the period of actual communication. 
Market makers communicate with each other in order to 
determine whether their markets are consistent with those of their 
competitors. This may be of primary importance if a market maker 
wishes to follow the market made by others, and does not wish to 
be non-competitive on either the bid or asked side of the market. 
It is necessary to check the markets of competitors since the flow of 
information concerning demand and supply may be concentrated 
in certain firms whose quotations will reflect that information.6 
Although market makers generally expect to receive incoming 
calls and hope to profit by the spread between their bid and asked, 
sometimes the incoming callers will negotiate with market makers. 
They may be able to purchase securities at slightly less than the 
offer and/or perhaps sell securities at slightly higher than the 
quoted bid. Normally, a market maker who wishes to accumulate 
securities will raise his bid and/or negotiate more readily in order 
to attract orders to himself and away from competing market 
makers.7 Conversely, if he wishes to sell securities, he often will 
lower his offer below that of competing market makers and thereby 
hope to attract inquiries from other broker-dealers who wish to 
purchase securities for themselves or for public customers. By 
shifting the bid and offer, broker-dealers, therefore, attempt to 
increase, decrease, or stabilize their inventories through encourage-
of inter-dealer quotations, and the role of the National Quotation Bureau, see Special 
Study pt. 2, at 595-609. 
6 While competition tends to keep the various over-the-counter "markets" in line 
with each other (assuming a lack of diversity in the evaluation of the market and the 
needs of the various market makers), it is entirely possible for variations to occur in 
the prices at which simultaneous transactions in particular securities are executed by 
different market makers simply because of the limitations of the communication network. 
7 On occasion, however, the lines of communication made available by a particular 
firm to the financial community may be sufficiently hardened by both custom and busi-
ness relationships that the quotation of better markets under certain circumstances may 
not be effective to attract the orders of broker-dealers accustomed to doing business else-
where. 
1964] OVER-THE-COUNTER QUOTATIONS 593 
ing or discouraging the orders of broker-dealers who are seeking 
the best market. Quotations, of course, are not merely the passive 
indicators of demand and supply. Quotations also represent the 
evaluation by the market maker of the potential or lack of it for 
the security (and the related advisability of decreasing,_ main-
taining, or increasing an inventory position) and, of course, rep-
resent the market maker's own financial resources and his reasons 
for making a market. 
The quotations, therefore, which are disseminated by voice 
and printed wire, or through the facilities of the National Quota-
tion Bureau, are the market; they reflect the incoming buy and 
sell orders on the market and the professional's evaluation of those 
orders and his own needs. 
Certain salient differences between the over-the-counter mar-
ket and the exchange market relevant to the quotations problem 
become immediately apparent. Of these, the most significant is 
the fact that no information is available to the public or even to 
the dealer community concerning the range of prices at which 
transactions occur, the average prices, or other data which would 
require compilation or extraction from the total universe of all 
executed transactions. Nor are there any reports of the volume of 
transactions in any security, either in the aggregate or by a par-
ticular dealer during any given period. In the exchange market, 
of course, such information is reported from second to second over 
the ticker tape; the opening, high, low and closing prices, and the 
volumes are published in the newspapers every day. Another ob-
vious and related difference is simply that, in the over-the-counter 
market, unlike the exchange market, there is no central focus 
comparable to the specialist's post on the exchange floor at which 
substantially all transactions in a particular security occur. Under 
such circumstances, the over-the-counter investor relies upon a 
quotation, not upon a report of an actual transaction in the market 
place for the price of an over-the-counter security. 
RETAIL QUOTATIONS 
The principal source of retail quotations is the daily news-
papers throughout the country. Some newspapers publish quota-
tions daily for securities traded primarily in a local area; others 
publish quotations for securities traded in wider geographical 
or regional areas; others, such as major New York daily news-
papers, publish the quotations for securities traded on a national 
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basis. 8 There are also lists on a regional or national basis published 
weekly by newspapers throughout the country. 
The decisions concerning which securities are suitable for pub-
lic dissemination of quotations are controlled by the NASD 
which has assumed responsibility for the administration and pub-
lication of quotations through public news media. The NASD 
imposes various minimum requirements in terms of the number 
and value of shares outstanding, the market price for the security, 
the number of shareholders, the extent of dealer interest, etc., 
which are required of securities traded in the over-the-counter 
market for dissemination in national, regional, and daily or weekly 
lists. Generally the requirements are more stringent with respect 
to the national list securities quoted on a daily basis than are the 
requirements for regional and/or weekly lists.9 
Bid and asked quotations are submitted by broker-dealers who 
are designated by the NASD to provide quotations for specified 
stocks. The designated broker-dealer sometimes has a substantial 
interest in the security and always knows that the quotation will 
be used for public dissemination. The designated broker-dealer, 
however, need not necessarily be "making a market" or have any 
interest in the security, nor must he necessarily have transactions 
with the public or anyone else in the security. Basically, an at-
tempt is made to equalize the burden of submitting quotations 
and to accede to preferences of dealers who may have an interest 
in wide publication of the quotation of a particular security. The 
designated broker-dealer assesses the market for the security at 
two points in time during the day as the market is made by those 
professional market makers who are responding to the demand 
for and the supply of the security. The quotation submitted to 
the NASD may be his own quotation, a representative quotation, 
or the best market for the security.10 The bid, the price a pro-
fessional market maker is willing to buy and the offer, the price 
s There are approximately 1,000 securities quoted in newspapers which are traded 
on a local basis and which are not quoted in regional or national lists. There are 
approximately 600 securities traded on regional lists (Pacific, Eastern, Midwest, South-
west) and 800 securities on the national list. The Wall Street Journal currently com-
bines the regional and national lists on a single list without separate identification into 
national or regional categories. 
9 special Study pt. 2, at 630-34. 
10 The Study found the quotations supplied by the designated dealers were often 
not the best market obtainable, i.e., did not represent the highest bid and/or lowest 
offer and in a sfgnificant number of instances were not as good as the median bids 
and offers being quoted by the various competing market makers who were advertising 
their markets for the security. Id. at 636-37. 
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at which it is willing to sell, are transmitted to the newspapers 
by or under the supervision of the NASD after receipt from the 
designated broker-dealer.11 Prior to the submission of the quota-
tion to the newspapers, however, the NASD adjusts the offer side 
of the market upward for actual publication. The adjustment of 
the quotation prior to publication does not result from any in-
adequacies in the mechanics of the market; rather, it represents 
a decision by the NASD to increase the offer by a fixed amount 
ranging from approximately 2 percent to 5 percent, depending 
on the price level of the security. Securities traded in the market 
up to 25 dollars are increased by adding about 5 percent to the 
offer, e.g., a security quoted in the market place at 20 bid-21 
offered is adjusted to 20 bid-22 offered for publication; those 
selling between 25 and 70 dollars are increased by 3.6 to 5 per-
cent; 70 and 100 dollars, from 2.5 to 3.6 percent; those selling 
between 100 and 135 dollars, from 2 to 2.5 percent; those over 
135 dollars, by approximately 2 percent.12 The adjustment, there-
fore, has the effect of increasing the spread between the bid and 
offer.18 
The upward adjustment, in effect, permits a broker-dealer 
who executes a public order on a principal basis to charge a ser-
vice fee which might vary considerably from the fee charged by 
others. For example, if the market for a security were 60 bid-
60 1 /2 offer (a relatively narrow dealer market usually reflecting 
competition and activity) the newspaper report after adjustment 
would be 60 bid-63 1 / 8 offer. A broker-dealer ordinarily would 
purchase the security for a public customer at the time of com-
pilation for 60 1/2 from a market maker. He might then charge 
a disclosed New York Stock Exchange commission (45 dollars for 
a round lot transaction) for the service performed as agent for 
the customer. Alternatively, the broker-dealer could execute the 
11 The quotation supplied the NASD by the designated dealer does not represent 
a range of transaction prices over a period of time, nor does the difference between the 
bid and offer supplied by the designated dealer represent the high and low of actual 
quotations during a period of time by all market makers or any particular market 
maker. Rather, it is a bid and offer of an unidentified dealer, as it was being made at a 
fixed but also unidentified point in time. This situation, however inadequate it may 
appear, compared to the flow of information concerning prices on an exchange, may be 
accounted for by the mechanics of the market which does not now provide facilities for 
a continuous reporting of transactions or quotations. 
12 Special Study pt. 2, at 634-35. 
18 The fact that the spread is widened for publication does not affect the market 
or jobbers tum of the dealers making markets. They continue to quote prices and 
execute transactions at or about the preadjusted quotations, hoping to buy at their 
bid and sell at their offer. 
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transaction in the principal form14 by purchasing the security for 
its own account at 60 1 /2 and immediately reselling it to the cus-
tomer at a higher net price in a so-called "riskless" transaction. 
Under such circumstances the dealer need not disclose the differ-
ential between its market cost and cost to customer. Since the news-
paper quotation has been adjusted upwards, in such situations 
the dealer often charges the published offer price, which on a 
100-share transaction would represent a 262 dollar service fee, or 
approximately six times the New York Stock Exchange commission 
for the same transaction.15 The investor cannot determine that he 
was charged a 262-dollar service fee, because the confirmation rules 
under the Exchange Act16 do not require disclosure of such infor-
mation on principal transactions ( even though functionally they 
may be indistinguishable from an agency transaction), and because 
the retail quotation system allows for the reporting of a quotation 
as if it were the underlying market quotation for the security. 
Some customers apparently are gratified to learn upon receipt of 
the confirmation that they have purchased the security at a net 
price, without payment of a commission! 
Newspapers usually report in a masthead preceding over-the-
counter quotations that the prices quoted are only a guide to the 
range within which the securities could have been sold. While 
such explanatory legend may be considered accurate if the word 
"guide" is emphasized and given a liberal meaning, it is suggested 
14 While theoretically the capacity of principal or agent is a matter for negotiation 
and/or the relationship between the parties, as a practical and customary business 
matter, the broker-dealer firm usually makes a unilateral decision as to capacity and 
typically does not base that decision on an evaluation of common-law doctrines of 
principal and agent. In this connection the Special Study reported the following 
colloquy: 
Q. Would you explain those circumstances in which a salesman would decide ••• 
to be principal and in which he would decide to be agent? 
A. How he would make that decision? 
Q. Yes. Is there a firm policy on this? 
A. No; there is no firm policy on it. 
Q. Well, is there a firm standard operating procedure? 
A. It is dictated somewhat by the salesman. In other words, he acts as principal. 
Q. Would he make more money out of it? 
A. In most cases, as a principal; yes. 
Special Study pt. 2, at 615. 
15 The Report found approximately 25% of all retail sales to the public in a randomly 
selected group of 78 securities which were quoted in the Wall Street Journal, which traded 
on January 18, 1962, were sold at the retail offer or higher. The average markup for 
riskless principal transactions was approximately 4% over cost. The Study also noted that 
for a sample of 200 securities traded on January 18, 1962, the average price paid by cus-
tomers on agency transactions was lower in 87% of the securities than the average net 
price paid by customers in purchases on a principal basis in riskless transactions. 
16 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1958 &: 
Supp. IV, 1963) [hereinafter cited as Exchange Act]. 
1964] OVER-THE-COUNTER QUOTATIONS 597 
that the use of the expresssion "range" may be misleading in the 
absence of disclosure that the range represents not market move-
ment, or high-low, but rather the fact that different executing 
broker-dealers charge a range of prices for the service of execu-
tion, and that the offer side of the market represents, for the 
average priced security, the maximum which could be charged 
under the NASD's markup policy.17 · 
This adjustment in the asked quotation prior to publication 
is the crux of the controversy over the retail quotations system. 
It is attacked and defended vigorously both on the level of prin-
ciple and upon the grounds of practical conduct and business 
needs. The avowed purpose of the adjustment is to assist retail 
dealers in selling securities as principal, 18 and particularly to fa-
cilitate so-called "riskless" transactions-that is, transactions by 
which a dealer, after receiving a customer's buy order, purchases 
the security from a market maker at the inside asked price and 
immediately resells it to the customer at an undisclosed markup 
over that asked price. The Report thought it improper to adjust 
prices included in an allegedly objective and accurate quotations 
system, simply to facilitate selling by enabling dealers to refrain 
from disclosing the service fee that they were charging. 
The usual defense of the system based on principle is to the 
effect that this adjustment approximates the actual retail market, 
since many dealers normally charge such a markup over the whole-
sale price, and that, since other merchants are not required to 
disclose wholesale prices and markups, securities dealers should 
not be required to do so. The difficulty with this argument is the 
fact that a cardinal principle of security regulation, particularly 
at the federal level, is to require disclosure of material facts. Ac-
tual markets and service costs appear to be material facts. In addi-
tion, it is the practice, not only in the exchange market for securi-
ties, but in most other public markets which are characterized 
by rapidly changing prices, to disclose the actual professional mar-
ket price or quotation. This is true, for example, of the com-
modities markets and of the money markets. Furthermore, quite 
apart from the fact that selling securities is not analogous (in the 
17 This is not to say that a more accurate masthead could cure the problem. The 
Commission noted in 1942 in connection with a basically similar system: "In fact, we 
have grave doubts if any statement in the masthead or elsewhere can cure the basically 
misleading character of these quotations. After careful consideration of the method of 
their compilation, we are at a loss to say what they represent affirmatively .•.• " Sherman 
Gleason &: Co., 15 S.E.C. 639, 653 (1944). 
18 NASD, Review of NA.SD Markup Policy, NASD Manual G-51 (1961). 
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scheme of government regulation) to selling automobiles or wash-
ing machines, there is a fundamental and functional economic 
reason for treating transactions in securities differently from trans-
actions in consumer goods. The public purchaser of consumer 
goods at the retail level can easily check markets, and then pur-
chase from the lowest seller. Since the underlying "wholesale" 
market for such goods does not change during the period of 
"shopping," it is not material to the buyer that he does not know 
the wholesale market price-the price paid by the merchant. In 
the securities markets, however, the underlying market price es-
tablished by the professsionals is constantly changing, thereby 
making it almost impossible to shop around and compare net 
prices charged because in a principal transaction, the portion of 
the net price attributable to the market change and the portion 
attributable to the service fee are indistinguishable. 
There is another answer to the argument based upon the 
analogy to retail merchants. While merchandising is, of course, 
an essential ingredient of the securities industry, that is not the 
entire story. To an important extent, the securities industry is a 
personal service business; indeed its representatives frequently 
characterize it as a "professsion."19 The regulatory pattern and 
ethical standards of the industry recognize and essentially are 
built upon this personal service concept and the obligations 
which flow therefrom.20 Thus viewed, a securities firm is, and 
usually represents itself to be, engaged not merely in selling com-
modities to customers, but rather in furnishing services to clients. 
These services essentially comprise locating and making available 
to the client investments which will be desirable for him, and 
furnishing various ancillary services. The substantial extent to 
which members of the industry act as agents for customers, rather 
than selling as principal to them, is another recognition of the 
service aspect of the business. But both the industry and the Com-
mission recognize that the fundamental relationships do not nec-
essarily depend upon the form of a particular transaction. What-
ever may be the practice of merchants in disclosing wholesale 
prices, it is, of course, universal practice in service industries to 
disclose to customers the price being charged for the service. 
The practical arguments for the existence of the present sys-
tem are somewhat more formidable. Defenders of the existing 
19 Special Study pt. I, at 240-42. 
20 Id. at 237-40. 
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quotation system maintain that the over-the-counter dealer is 
confronted with a dilemma. For competitive reasons, they say, he 
cannot charge a disclosed selling commission or service charge in 
excess of the New York Stock Exchange commission schedule be-
cause, if he did, customers would buy listed securities instead of 
over-the-counter securities or would take their business elsewhere 
-probably to a totally commission-oriented firm. This, it is con-
tended, would be most detrimental to the health of the market, 
for many firms cannot limit themselves to the New York Stock 
Exchange commission schedule and survive because the cost of 
selling and doing business in the over-the-counter market is higher 
than is the cost in the exchange market. This latter is asserted to 
be true for two principal reasons. First, since investors are not as 
familiar with over-the-counter securities as they are with listed 
securities, and the material facts with respect to over-the-counter 
securities are often much harder to come by, research costs and 
selling costs are considerably higher. Second, costs of execution 
are somewhat higher since a dealer must communicate with one 
or more market makers, check their prices, report to the customer, 
and execute the order instead of merely sending it to the ex-
change floor. It is consequently asserted that the higher undis-
closed markup in the over-the-counter market is necessary to the 
business survival of many dealers. Their absence, it is argued, 
would materially diminish the liquidity of the market. 
Probably the validity of these contentions cannot be estab-
lished on the basis of either statistics or history, since over-the-
counter dealers have never been required to operate under a 
system of disclosure of inside prices and of markups. However, 
quite apart from the validity of the assertions concerning the 
higher cost of over-the-counter transactions, it is clear that dis-
closure of service fees has not inhibited selling in exchange securi-
ties, or in mutual funds or underwritten offerings where customary 
fees consistently exceed the typical over-the-counter principal 
markup. 
Further, some facts are available which seem to cast doubt 
upon the empirical foundations for the arguments made for 
preservation of the current system. The Study reported that a 
substantial number of shares sold to the public in the over-the-
counter market involved executions on a disclosed agency basis. 
The Report noted in this connection: 
"In terms of number of shares, 61 percent of the pur-
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chases and 75 percent of the sales by the public on January 
18, 1962, were made through broker-dealers as agent. By 
dollar volume, broker-dealers acted as agent in slightly less 
than one-half of the purchases and 62 percent of the sales 
by the public."21 
Analysis was also made of the type of firms which executed 
transactions as principal and agent in order to determine whether 
the smaller, perhaps less efficient firms predominately sold securi-
ties as principal or agent. The Report found: 
"From the reports received of trading in the January 
18, 1962, sample of 200 stocks, it was observed that certain 
firms consistently traded as principal in stocks in which they 
made markets but acted as agent in all others. In all stocks 
on January 18, 1962, 740 broker-dealers, or 40 percent of 
the 1,839 who had purchases or sales for public customers 
(individuals and institutions), effected all of their trans-
actions with the public on an agency basis. On the other 
hand, 290 broker-dealers, or 16 percent, effected all of their 
transactions with the public on a principal basis. About two-
thirds of the broker-dealers in the former group were small 
firms which had less than $10,000 of transactions for the 
public during the day. 
"On January 18, 1962, individuals purchased over-the-
counter stocks from or through a total of 1,398 broker-deal-
ers. Of these firms, 517 always acted as agent for the cus-
tomer and 407 dealt exclusively on a principal basis; these 
924 firms that dealt exclusively on one basis or the other 
tended to be firms with small public business so that 1 or 2 
transactions may have represented their total volume of in-
dividuals' purchases that day. Apart from this, however, 
there was no readily apparent distinction between firms with 
smaller or larger volume as to the handling of public busi-
ness on a principal or agency basis. A distribution of broker-
dealer firms by size of individual customers' purchases and 
by proportion of such purchases made on an agency basis 
indicates that there is no tendency for firms with small vol-
ume to act more frequently on a principal basis than firms 
with larger volumes."22 
Finally, the Report noted that in the higher priced stocks 
(which presumably are better known and require less selling effort 
21 Id. pt. 2, at 612. 
22 Id. at 613. 
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and research), the proportion of principal transactions with the 
public was higher than those of lower price, and that risk.less 
transactions with individual purchasers accounted for less than 
twenty percent of their purchase transactions.28 
In an analysis not published in the Report, but derived from 
data submitted to it, it was determined that in a sample of 200 
securities,24 364 firms executed principal risk.less transactions. 
Forty-four percent of these firms were members of the New York 
Stock Exchange. Of the fifty-six percent of the broker-dealers who 
were not members of that exchange, it appeared that those broker-
dealers whose adjusted net capital was between 100,000 dollars 
and 500,000 dollars were predominant in number and also most 
important in terms of number of "risk.less" purchases and sales 
effected. In contrast, small firms (i.e., those with net capital of 
10,000 dollars or less) accounted for only about fifteen percent 
of all nonmember broker-dealers who effected "risk.less" trades, 
and for less than ten percent of the number of such trades. A fur-
ther breakdown of the nonmember broker-dealers by location 
of their main offices indicated that all but eighteen firms were 
located in cities of more than 100,000 population. 
While the data above does not relate to the overall costs of 
firms who execute transactions on a principal basis, it does not 
support the argument that the principal form of transaction is 
generally used by the small, non-metropolitan firm, which exe-
cutes transactions in low-priced stocks and which requires an un-
disclosed higher markup to remain in business. Clearly, some 
firms fall into that category and indeed some would be threatened 
by any substantial change in the existing system. On balance, 
however, from the data accumulated to date, it appears that the 
problem of the small firm may be somewhat overstated, or per-
haps misdirected, in placing the burden for assuming their eco-
nomic survival on the continuation of the present system, rather 
than on more fundamental remedies which might render them 
more efficient and financially stable. 
Quite apart from the economic consequence of requiring dis-
closure of the market, it has not been established that customers 
could not be persuaded to pay a higher commission or service 
charge if they were educated to the fact that the service may be 
23 Id. at 612-14. 
24 For a detailed discussion of the methods of selection of the security sample, the 
time periods studied, and the universe of reporting broker-dealers, see id. at 543-46. 
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worth the price, which in many instances might be the fact. It 
appears to be assumed by many in the financial industry that 
disclosure is inconsistent with merchandising securities. The fact 
that over-the-counter securities are less popular and less well-
known than listed securities may increase the likelihood that 
securities which are, in fact, undervalued may be found in the 
over-the-counter market by the diligent dealer who, by discover-
ing such a security for an investor, will have performed a service 
justifying a fee materially in excess of the ordinary stock exchange 
commission. The public might be educated to that fact, rather 
than kept in the dark for fear it would not understand. The Re-
port concluded in this connection: 
"A standard justification for the present system is to the 
effect that the public would misunderstand any other system, 
but it may not be assumed that the over-the-counter markets 
can function only by withholding what in other contexts 
is deemed essential information. The NASD and other in-
dustry organizations can and should undertake further efforts 
to educate the public as to the mechanisms of the over-the-
counter markets, in this and other respects. While a change 
from the present quotation system may create special need 
for educational efforts, it is believed that little explanation 
will be needed for a system which does not hold itself out 
to be something more than or different from what it is in 
fact."25 
Proponents of the existing system also urge that aggressive 
merchandising is necessary to preserve liquidity in the over-the-
counter market, particularly as to lower priced and more obscure 
issues. There is very little spontaneous buying of these securities-
while there is considerable spontaneous purchasing of over-the-
counter issues of institutional grade and for many New York Stock 
Exchange issues. Consequently, it is maintained that unless dealers 
have an incentive to sell these securities at retail-and do so-there 
will be few, if any, buyers available when holders wish to sell. Re-
tail selling is asserted to be necessary to the maintenance of whole-
sale markets, since market makers will not buy securities unless 
they are in a position to sell them, and the retail dealers are their 
only outlet. This is particularly true since the average dealer mak-
ing a market is not an investor who acquires securities for apprecia-
tion, but rather looks for his profit in the existence of a spread be-
25 Id. at 667. 
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tween the inside bid and asked price and in his ability to dispose 
promptly of positions taken and thereby avoid the risks of market 
depreciation. 
While there is undoubtedly considerable validity to these 
contentions, it would seem that they cannot be pressed too far. 
If a situation develops in which the rewards of merchandising 
obscure or low-priced stocks exceed those obtainable from selling 
more seasoned securities, dealers may develop an incentive to 
push a questionable class of merchandise upon investors. In other 
words, there comes a point when liquidity for particular issues 
may not be worth its cost in terms of intensive merchandising of 
speculative securities to unwary investors. That point clearly is 
reached in the "boiler room" situation. Presumably, the main . 
reason boiler rooms sell bad rather than good stocks is the simple 
fact that they can get bad stocks at very low cost and mark them 
up excessively, thus covering the high costs that attend a boiler 
room operation. Of course, the type of merchandise that boiler 
rooms sell is rarely included in the retail quotations system; 
nevertheless the excesses of boiler rooms vividly illustrate the 
consequences of high rewards for the aggressive merchandising 
of otherwise illiquid securities. Even apart from the boiler room 
situation, several thousands of securities are now quoted in the 
over-the-counter market in which there is but one market maker 
who in turn creates, through a merchandising campaign, suffi-
cient liquidity to enable him to assume and dispose of positions. 
In such a non-competitive market, the danger from not disclosing 
the true market to customers, particularly in terms of the spread 
maintained by such dealer, may, and often does, result in invest-
ments being made with little awareness of potential risks. 
A practical objection to the existing system, which has been 
advanced from time to time within the securities industry, is that, 
by artificially widening the published spread between the bid and 
the asked price, the existing retail quotation system creates an 
unjustified impresssion in the mind of knowledgeable investors 
that over-the-counter markets are characterized by wide spreads 
and are, therefore, presumably inactive and illiquid; in fact, how-
ever, there exists for many of the better known over-the-counter 
issues, and particularly those quoted in the national lists of the 
retail quotations system, a close, liquid, and active market. In 
bank securities, for example, which typically are higher priced 
than most over-the-counter stocks, the market may be quite nar-
row because of the quality of the security, institutional interest, 
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and significant dealer participation. However, the published quo-
tations may show spreads quite inappropriate as a reflection of 
the market, thereby misleading even government bodies (for ex-
ample, as to the appropriate tax base), the companies themselves 
and the public as to the depth of the market or the prices at 
which a customer could purchase the security.26 
The response of the NASD to one of the practical objections 
to the existing system-the possibility of excessive markups-has 
been an endeavor to regulate the amount of the markup through 
its so-called five percent policy.27 Under this policy it is deemed 
a violation of ethical principles for a dealer to sell a security at 
a price not reasonably related to the current market price, or to 
charge a commission which is not reasonable. In part as a result 
of the statutory inhibition upon the existence of any fixed dis-
counts or commissions by the NASD,28 and in part for practical 
reasons, this policy-notwithstanding its name-is quite flexible. 
In general, a dealer is required to determine the wholesale mar-
ket, and then to add to that a markup which is reasonable under 
all of the circumstances. A figure not in excess of five percent is 
commonly accepted, but it is recognized that in certain situations, 
particularly involving low-priced securities, a higher markup 
may be justified.29 As the Report pointed out, the administration 
and enforcement of this policy has proved to be a difficult task, 
26 The New York Times has recently revised its masthead for over-the-counter securi• 
ties. It now states: "Ranges, supplied by the National Association of Securities Dealers, 
reflect prices at which securities could have been sold (bid) or bought (asked). The asked 
quotations are adjusted upward by the N.A.S.D.; it is sometimes possible to obtain lower 
prices on actual purchases." 
The Report found, in support of the Times conclusion concerning lower prices that: 
"In 82 percent of the stocks in the sample traded on January 18, 1962, in which com-
parisons could be made, the average cost to individual customers of purchases from 
dealers acting as principal was higher than the cost of purchases on an agency basis. 
Moreover, agency transactions usually result in a lower cost of execution to a customer 
than a principal purchase on a net basis, whether the firm sells to the customer out 
of its inventory or purchases the stock and then sells it to the customer in a riskless 
transaction. In 80 percent of the securities studied, when an individual public customer 
purchased shares from a dealer with an inventory which existed prior to the order, the 
customer paid more on the average than when he purchased through a broker on an 
agency basis (including commissions). Similarly, the net price to individual customers in 
principal purchases from firms which had no positions were also more costly than pur-
chases on an agency basis. Of the stocks in the sample in which both of these types of 
executions occurred on January 18, 1962, the average price of purchases on a principal 
basis was higher in 87 percent of the stocks." Special Study pt. 2, at 625. 
27 NASD, Review of NASD Markup Policy, NASD Manual G-1 to G-6 (1961). 
28 See Exchange Act § 15A(b)(7). 
29 But see Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1496 (2d ed. 1961): "In every case to go to the 
SEC so far the claim has been made that a higher mark-up is justified in selling low-
priced stocks, and in every case the Commission has recognized the principle but rejected 
the claim on the facts." 
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both because of the amount of surveillance required in order to 
provide effective enforcement and because of uncertainties which 
make it difficult for a dealer to determine either the amount of 
the markup which is permissible in a particular case, or the price 
which represents the "prevailing market" at a particular time.80 
Unfortunately, the latter difficulty is particularly great in the 
case of low-priced or illiquid securities with wide spreads, where 
the market is both thin and erratic and where it may be almost 
impossible to determine what is the "prevailing market" at a 
given time. In view of these and other difficulties, the Report 
concluded that, although the NASD markup policy sets im-
portant outer limits of conduct and undoubtedly precludes gross 
over-reaching,81 it is not a sufficiently precise instrument to furnish 
a suitable substitute for more adequate disclosure of the under-
lying markets. 
From time to time, various alternatives to either publishing 
the inside or actual market price or continuing the present system 
have been suggested. One that has been advanced is simply to 
publish the inside bid price, which is generally agreed to be a 
proper practice, and not to publish any offer at all (in view of the 
contention that to publish the inside offer would damage the 
liquidity of the market and to publish the adjusted offer would 
be misleading). This device would also eliminate the confusion 
in the minds of some investors between the bid and asked price 
and the stock exchange high and low. On the other hand, it is 
asserted that investors who saw a bid price in the newspaper 
would assume that this was the price at which they could expect 
to purchase the security, or at least the price to which selling 
commissions or other charges would be added in determining 
the price they would pay. In many over-the-counter securities the 
spread between the inside bid and asked price is quite large, 
often amounting to twenty percent or more. The customer who 
saw a security quoted in a newspaper at a bid price of four dollars 
and was charged five dollars for it might assume that the dealer 
was charging a markup of one dollar, whereas in fact most of the 
difference would represent the spread in the wholesale markets 
and the dealer might actually be obtaining a markup of only a 
few cents. 
Another possible approach is to seek a gradual transition which 
80 For a discussion of the controversy and uncertainties involved in determining the 
appropriate base from which to compute mark-up, see Special Study pt. 2, at 643-53. 
81 Id. at 668. 
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perhaps could be halted at whatever point practical experience 
indicated the change was doing more harm than good. While it 
may well be true that many securities in the over-the-counter 
market depend for liquidity upon aggressive merchandising, this 
is not true of all securities. Many of the securities traded in the 
over-the-counter market, for example those of the large banks 
and insurance companies, are the subject of wide institutional, 
investor, and broker-dealer interest and are characterized by close, . 
active, and liquid markets. It can hardly be said that the markets 
for these securities depend wholly upon the merchandising activ-
ities of particular retail dealers. On the other hand, it is precisely 
as to these securities that the objections to the existing system 
seem most cogent, insofar as the wide spreads in the newspapers 
convey to prospective investors the false impression that the mar-
ket is poor or inactive, thus discouraging investment in these 
securities. It is submitted, therefore, that the unadjusted inter-
dealer quotations for these securities might be published perhaps 
on an experimental basis. The results could then be evaluated 
and a determination reached upon the basis of experience, rather 
than upon theory or conjecture, as to whether or not injury to 
the markets or to any segment of the broker-dealer community 
would result. Upon the basis of this experience, decisions could 
be made as to whether or not the principle should be applied to 
all over-the-counter securities, or at least as to how far and fast 
it would be safe to go in extending the principle of market dis-
closure to other categories of over-the-counter securities. 
These are not easy questions, and no easy answer presents 
itself. It would appear, however, that the existing system requires 
substantial improvement. Not only is it now inconsistent with 
the full disclosure principle, but it provides a cloak for excessive 
selling charges, and therefore an incentive to undue selling pres-
sures. Moreover, it is unlikely that the existing system will long 
survive unchanged even if it is not modified by regulatory action. 
Rapid technological advances in data collection may make it feasi-
ble to collect and rapidly disseminate information concerning 
actual transactions of market makers with other dealers. Indeed, 
this is probably technically feasible at the present time and, if not 
presently feasible economically, it is likely to become so. Once 
this occurs, the publication in newspapers of quotations at vari-
ance with those otherwise obtaining in the market place could 
hardly continue. 
